We introduce a new fixed-length representation of fingerprint minutiae, for use in template protection. It is similar to the 'spectral minutiae' representation of Xu et al. but is based on coordinate differences between pairs of minutiae. Our technique has the advantage that it does not discard the phase information of the spectral functions. We show that the fingerprint matching performance (Equal Error Rate) is comparable to that of the original spectral minutiae representation, while the speed is improved.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Privacy-preserving storage of biometric data
Biometrics-based authentication has become popular because of its convenience. Biometrics cannot be forgotten or left at home. While biometric data is not exactly secret (we are leaving a trail of fingerprints, DNA etc.), it is important to protect biometric data for privacy reasons. Unprotected storage would reveal medical conditions and would allow cross-matching different databases. Large-scale availability of unprotected biometric data would make it easier for malevolent parties to leave misleading traces at a crime scene (artificial fingerprints [10] , synthesized DNA [7] ). An easy way to protect a biometric database against breaches and insider attacks is to store biometrics in hashed form, just like passwords, but with the addition of an error-correction step to get rid of the measurement noise. To prevent critical leakage from the redundancy data, one uses a Helper Data System (HDS) [9] , [5] , [13] , for instance a Fuzzy Extractor or a Secure Sketch [8] , [6] , [4] . A HDS typically makes use of an error-correcting code and hence needs a fixed-length representation of the biometric. Such a representation is not straightforward when the measurement noise can cause features of the biometric to appear/disappear. A fixed-length representation called spectral minutiae was introduced by Xu et al. [19] , [16] , [17] , [18] . A Fourier-like spectral function is built up on a fixed discrete grid; each detected fingerprint minutia adds a contribution to the function. Comparison of spectral functions is robust against changes in the number of detected biometric features.
B. Contributions and outline
We have the following results regarding fingerprint minutiae.
• We introduce spectral functions based on pairs of minutiae.
By working with coordinate differences we immediately obtain a translation-invariant representation. Whereas Xu et WIFS 2017 , December, 4-7, 2017 al.'s spectral functions discard phase information in order to achieve translation invariance, our method retains it.
• We test our technique on two fingerprint databases. The achieved Equal Error Rate is comparable to Xu et al.
• Our fingerprint matching is faster even though we have to sum over minutia pairs instead of individual minutiae. The speedup is due to the fact that we need fewer grid points.
• A further speedup can be obtained by skipping one step in the verification: rotating the fingerprint to obtain optimal alignment with the enrolled image. Skipping this step leads only to a minimal penalty in terms of error rates. In Section II we briefly review HDSs and spectral minutiae. In Section III we discuss the drawbacks of Xu et al.'s technique. We introduce our minutia pair approach in Section IV, and we study its matching performance in Section V. Section VI discusses the computational efficiency of the verification.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation and terminology
The number of minutiae found in a fingerprint is Z. The j'th minutia coordinates are x j , y j and its orientation is θ j . Let f be a function of two real-valued arguments. The
is given by f (x, y) = (
, where u av = 1 n i u i and σ
We will use the abbreviations FRR = False Reject Rate, FAR = False Accept Rate, EER = Equal Error Rate, ROC = Receiver Operating Characteristic.
B. Helper Data Systems
A HDS consists of two functions, Gen and Rec. Given an enrollment measurement X, Gen produces redundancy data W ∈ {0, 1} * called helper data and a secret S. The helper data is stored. The storage is considered insecure, i.e. attackers learn W . Later, a verification measurement is performed, yielding outcome X ≈ X. The Rec function takes as input X and W . It outputs an estimatorŜ which should equal S. In a general HDS, there is no constraint on the distribution of S. A desirable property is that S has high entropy given W . A HDS is the perfect primitive for protection of biometric databases against inside attackers, who typically obtain access not only to stored data but also to decryption keys. The HDS creates a noiseless secret and makes it possible to protect biometric secrets in the same way as passwords: by hashing. For every user, the database contains W and a hash χ(S). At verification, the hash of the reconstructedŜ is compared against χ(S). Ideally, W contains just enough information to allow for error correction, and does not leak any privacysensitive information about the biometric X. Furthermore, if χ is a properly chosen one-way function and S has enough entropy given W , the hash value χ(S) does not reveal S. HDSs for discrete sources [2] , [8] , [3] , [6] , [4] and continuum sources [9] , [14] , [5] , [13] are a well studied topic. Typically a HDS uses an error correcting code, which requires that X is turned into a fixed-length representation.
C. Spectral representation of minutiae
Subsequent measurements of the same finger may not always result in the same set of observed minutiae. This is problematic if one needs a fixed-length representation of a fingerprint. The technique of spectral minutiae was introduced by Xu et al. [19] , [16] , [17] as a way to obtain a fixed-length representation. The set of enrolled minutiae is turned into a function f σ (x, y) on the xy-plane by summing narrow Gaussian peaks (with width σ) centered on the minutia locations; then a translationinvariant expression g σ is obtained by taking the absolute value of the Fourier transform,
In order to get simple behaviour under rotation and scaling, they sampled g σ on a log-polar grid. Let k x (α, β) = e α cos β and k y (α, β) = e α sin β where α, β are sampled with equal spacing. A matrix G σ is constructed as
Under the combination of scaling and rotation,
α+ln λ,β+ϕ . For small σ it holds that σ/λ ≈ σ and hence the transform is almost equal to a shift on the αβ-grid. 1 Xu et al. investigated matching in the spectral minutiae domain by looking at the Pearson correlation between a freshly obtained G σ and the enrolled G σ . Their procedure included a search to find values λ, ϕ that maximise the correlation. In practice one can fix λ = 1, and the ϕ-search can be restricted to the interval [−10
• , +10
• ], in steps of 2 • . To extract more information, Xu et al introduced a variant of the g σ function which contains information about the minutia orientations θ j . They inserted a factor (k x cos θ j + k y sin θ j ) or e iθj into the summation in g σ . Unsurprisingly, using information from both the ordinary G σ representation and the 1 The effect on σ was not explicitly mentioned in the work of Xu et al. 
III. MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK
The spectral minutiae technique as developed by Xu et al [19] , [16] , [17] has a number of unsatisfactory aspects. 1) Translation invariance is obtained by taking the absolute value of a Fourier transform. This discards information. 2) Xu et al conclude that the scaling factor λ does not have to be taken into account, since it is close to 1. Yet in their best implementation they still apply logarithmic sampling in the
Such sampling does not match the radial information density in the fingerprint and hence makes it necessary to take many samples.
3) The ϕ-search is time consuming. This is caused not by the repeated re-computation of the correlation, but by the fact that in a full HDS every ϕ-attempt needs an evaluation of the Rec function and the computation of a hash. We address the first issue by introducing a spectral representation that is based on coordinate differences x a − x b only. The advantage is translation invariance without information loss, enabling us to work with fewer samples. The drawback is that each summation over Z minutiae is replaced by a summation over Z 2 pairs. The overall effect on the computation time during reconstruction is a tradeoff between these two. In Section VI we show that the tradeoff works in our advantage. We address the second issue by performing a Fourier transform only in the angular direction. In the radial direction our sampling occurs in the spatial domain and is linear. The third issue could be addressed by developing a method to quickly determine the global orientation of a fingerprint image. (Knowledge of the orientation, even if inaccurate, reduces the search space. Furthermore, storing the global orientation during enrolment does not leak sensitive information.) However, with our pair-based spectral representation it turns out that executing the ϕ-search yields only a very modest performance improvement; the search may as well be omitted. In Section V-C we show the difference in performance. Related work. The NIST Bozorth matcher [15] works with minutia pairs and retains orientation information from both minutiae, whereas we retain only the difference. However, [15] does not produce a fixed-length representation. Nandakumar's approach [11] keeps the phase information from the spectral function but does not have translation invariance. Here the subscript x denotes the set of minutia locations, and θ stands for the set of minutia orientations. We call the functions L x , L xθ 'spectral' because (1) is the Fourier transform (with respect to ln R and the angle ϕ) of a sum of delta functions centered on the values x a − x b in the plane. Let Φ = ( 
IV. THE MINUTIA-PAIR APPROACH
A. Definitions and properties
In the radial direction, the functions M x and M xθ consist of a sum of Z 2 Gaussian peaks centered on the values R ab . The width σ reduces the scheme's sensitivity to small perturbations in the minutia properties. Under a rotation (
We want all our spectral functions to be single-valued. 2 Hence q has to be integer.
Lemma IV.1. Let q be odd. Then it holds that L x (q, w) = 0 for all w, and M x (q, R) = 0 for all R.
Proof. In (1) 
B. Choosing the grid points
We have to choose a (q, w)-grid on which to evaluate L x and L xθ . On the one hand, the grid should contain many points so that the spectral functions contain sufficient information about the fingerprint. On the other hand, having too many 2 Invariant under rotations ϕ that are an integer multiple of 2π.
points results in an inefficient scheme. Lemma IV.1 tells us that we do not have to compute L x for odd q. Furthermore, we know that, at a given q, the spectral functions detect angular periodic features of size ≈ 2π/q radians. This leads to a natural cutoff at large q where the length scale becomes smaller than the feature size, and noise starts to dominate. Similarly, there is a natural maximum for w, namely where 2π/w matches min ab:a =b ln R ab . Finally we note that
q L * xθ (q, w). This means that the grid point (−q, −w) contains exactly the same information as (q, w) and hence can be omitted. The above considerations are the only theoretical guidelines for choosing the grid; the best choice must be found by trial and error. The considerations for M x , M xθ are similar. The grid is a (q, R)-grid. The maximum q should be roughly the same as for the L-functions. The cutoffs for R are min ab:a =b R ab and max ab R ab . We have
Hence it suffices to look at q > 0.
C. Introducing weights
In the computation of a spectral function at enrollment, it is possible to introduce a weight factor for each of the (a, b)-pairs in the summation. It is advantageous to set a low weight for pairs which are unlikely to be recovered. A low recovery likelihood may occur e.g. when a minutia has low quality. Another reason can be a very large value of R ab , in which case the recovery is sensitive to noise at the edge of the image, or a very small R ab which may cause minutia misidentification in case of noise. We have not used weights other than 0 or 1.
D. Choosing the score function
Let F denote one of the four spectral functions L x , L xθ , M x , M xθ obtained at enrollment, and F the noisy version in the verification phase. We need a metric which quantifies how close F is to F . As F is complex-valued, there are quite some options. We have experimented with correlation functions for the radial and phase part of the complex numbers, as well as the real and imaginary part. Furthermore we have tried distance in the complex plane, with and without normalisation of the function F as a whole. In our experiments it turns out that a complex correlation-like quantity is best able to discriminate between genuine fingerprint matches and impostors. We define our score S as
where ρ stands for the correlation as defined in Section II-A, and the matrices F, F are treated as vectors.
E. Fusion of scores
The spectral functions L x and L xθ together contain more information about the fingerprint than each one separately. The information is partially overlapping. We construct a 'fused' score by adding the two scores (7) in the same way as [19] :
Analogously, for the M -functions we work with the fused score S(M x , M x ) + S(M xθ , M xθ ).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have applied our minutia-pair approach to the Verifinger database and the MCYT database [12] . The former contains fingerprints from six individuals, ten fingers per individual, eight images per finger. The size of each image is 326 × 357 pixels. The MCYT database contains fingerprints from 100 individuals, 10 fingers per individual, 12 images per finger (256 × 400 pixels). The fingerprints are of higher quality than in the Verifinger database. We extracted minutia properties from the images by using the VeriFinger software [1] .
A. Optimal parameter choices
Good results were obtained with the following settings. and M x functions we take only even q (Lemma IV.1). We set σ = 2.3 pixels. A minutia extracted by VeriFinger is labeled with a quality Q ∈ [0, 100]. We took only minutiae with Q ≥ 45. We used an additional selection rule that turns out to improve overall results a bit: a minutia pair is discarded from the ab summation in (1,2,5,6) if 2R ab exceeds the horizontal size of the image. In Fig. 1 we show an example of M x and M xθ . Entirely different fingers obviously produce very different results. The two leftmost columns correspond to the same finger. Noisy images of the same finger do not produce results that, to the human eye, are clearly correlated. However, it turns out (Section V-B) that the similarities are enough to distinguish the enrolled user from an impostor.
B. ROC curves and Equal Error Rates
We work in a verification setting, i.e. a stated identity has to be verified. We determine the FRR by comparing, for each finger in the database, all the pairs of images. We determine the FAR by looking at each pair of different fingers, where one image is drawn at random for each finger (independently per pair). 3 We draw ROC curves as FAR plotted against FRR. Each point in the ROC curve corresponds to one threshold setting. The EER is the error rate in the point where FRR equals FAR. Table I lists the EERs that we obtained. The ROC curves are shown in Fig. 2 . The M -functions consistently outperform the L-functions, and the L xθ , M xθ functions outperform the location based functions. Fusion of M x and M xθ yields only a modest improvement over M xθ . We conclude that, in our pairbased approach, the best option is to work either with M xθ or the fusion of M x and M xθ . We benchmark our system against results reported by Xu et al. [19] , which are based on ten individuals in the MCYT database who have high-quality fingerprints. The ROC curves are shown in Fig. 3 , and the EER comparison in Table II . 4 We conclude that M xθ has a performance comparable to Xu et al.'s spectral function. 
C. Rotation of the verification image
The results of Section V-B were obtained without Xu et al.'s procedure of trying out several image rotations. Now we discuss what happens when we do try different rotations ϕ. First we checked how a rotation ϕ ∈ (−10 • , +10
• ) affects the M x and M xθ -based score in case of a genuine image pair. At some optimal angle ϕ 0 the score is maximal. For all genuine pairs we determined ϕ 0 , for M x and M xθ . The histograms of ϕ 0 are shown in Fig. 4 . We see that typically |ϕ 0 | < 6
• . The ROC curves in Fig. 5 show the impact of [19] . The L and M function were computed for individuals 16, 24, 26, 32, 34, 35, 46, 53, 80, 94 . Hence our verification is faster than [19] , [16] , [17] . Note that [18] introduces a reduced template size by applying Principal Component Analysis or a Discrete Fourier Transform to select informative features. This selection reduces the template size by roughly a factor 10. However, these methods still require computation of the spectral function on many grid points.
VII. DISCUSSION
Achieving translation invariance by looking at minutia pairs seems to be advantageous compared to taking the absolute value of a Fourier transform. The minutia-pair approach is able to extract information from a fingerprint using fewer grid points. We conjecture that this is due to the fact that our spectral functions retain phase information instead of discarding it. Of the four functions that we studied, the M xθ performs best. Fusion of the matching scores from M x and M xθ leads to an EER comparable to Xu et al. Due to the reduction of the number of grid points our method is faster than the verification described by Xu et al., in spite of the increased number of summation terms. As an unexpected bonus, it turns out that we can omit the search for an optimal rotation; this gives an additional speed improvement. As topics for future work we mention (i) further speedup by discarding grid points that have a bad signal-to-noise ratio; (ii) applying Principal Component Analysis and similar techniques to improve the EER; (iii) constructing a HDS based on M x and M xθ .
